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Parens Patriae "Treatment": Legal
Punishment in Disguise
By LEE COLEMAN, M.D.* and TRUDY SOLOMON**

The rationale of state intervention in individual affairs under the

doctrine of parens patriae is that the state has a right and a duty to help
and protect those who cannot help themselves.1 All measures taken
under the doctrine are justified as intended ultimately for the individual's own good. Cast in the mold of the medical model, which has

gained increasing influence since the end of the nineteenth century,
'2
this intervention has been denominated "therapy" or "treatment."
By the process termed divestment, many areas of the criminal law
have been either abandoned outright, in favor of parens patriae civil
interventions, or profoundly influenced in ways discussed below. 3 Until
* Practicing psychiatrist in California.
** Doctoral candidate in Social Psychology at the University of California,

Berkeley.

1. N. KrrrlE, THE

RIGHT TO BE DnwFEuNT (1971) [hereinafter cited as Krris probably the best single source for direction to the literature of parens patriae
interventions. Noting that the term is "derived from the English concept of the King's
role as father of the country," Kittrie states, "[w]ithin this system, little or no emphasis
is placed upon an individual's guilt of a particular crime; but much weight is given to
his physical, mental, or social shortcomings. In dealing with the deviant . . .society
is said to be acting in a parental role (parens patriae)-seeking not to punish but to
change or socialize the nonconformist through treatment and therapy." Id. at 3.
2. A fundamental tenet of the state's role in parens patriae is the viewing of deviant behavior as symptomatic of disease or illness rather than as a reflection of political
and social norms that define unacceptable behavior. For a critical discussion of the assumptions underlying the medical or psychiatric approach to deviance, see R. LEIFER,
IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH 17-53 (1969). KirmE, supra note 1, at 1-49, provides an introduction to the historical development of the medical model.
3. Kittrie makes an important point when he notes: 'This process of divestment
has not been motivated, on the whole, by societal willingness to begin tolerating the conduct or condition previously designated as criminal. Instead, divestment has most frequently indicated a shift from criminal sanctions to a different system of social controls.
Thus divestment, carried out in the name of the new social emphasis upon therapy, rehabilitation, and prevention-as contrasted with criminal laws emphasis upon retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence-has produced new types of borderland [sic] pro'fuE],
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recently, this divestment process has been almost universally applauded.

Rather than meting out criminal sanctions, the state has

-promised treatment to wayward youth, the mentally disordered, drug
addicts, and even many criminals.' The due process concerns of the
criminal sanction were ignored; one should not need protection from
one's therapist. Such constraints would, in fact, amount to an outright
interference with the treatment process.
The state's benevolence has been questioned in recent years.
Case law indicates that the courts are abandoning their hands-off atti-

tude, and have begun to realize that due process protections are important, even in allegedly therapeutic or rehabilitative interventions. 5 Civil

commitment statutes are being revised by state legislatures to reflect
greater concern for civil liberties. 6 Prison therapy and indeterminate
sentencing are increasingly recognized as potentially powerful tools of

control, -rather than as instruments of rehabilitation.7 Benevolent inceedings and sanctions, lodged between the civil and criminal law." Krrrm, supra note
1, at 5 (footnote omitted).
4. The optimism of nineteenth century reformers is well chronicled in D. RoTnMAN, THm DIscovERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971) [hereinafter cited as ROTHMAN].
5. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (requiring an informal
hearing as a prerequisite to revocation of parole); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) (holding that the Arizona juvenile code impliedly includes the requirements of due process
in delinquency proceedings); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (requiring hearings as a prerequisite to imposition of an indeterminate sentence under the Colorado Sex
Offenders Act).
6.

B. ENNis

& L. SIEGEL, THE RiGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTs 93-282 (1973)

[here-

inafter cited as ENNIs & SIEGEL], summarizes the commitment statutes for each of the
fifty states as of the time of its printing. The general trend in recent years is away
from an "in need of treatment" standard of commitment, in which serious mental disorder is sufficient cause for confinement, toward a "dangerousness" standard, in which the
mental disorder must portend the likelihood of injury to self (i.e., suicide or inability
to care for basic needs) or to others prior to involuntary commitment. See A. BRooKS,
LAw, PSYCHATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM1 675-726 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as BRooKs]. Simultaneously, however, massive documentation has demonstrated that
psychiatrists lack the ability to make these judgments, and that they consistently overprediet dangerousness. See, e.g., Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). See also
AMERICAN PsYcHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL

(Task Force Report No. 8, July 1974), which concludes: "Psychiatric expertise in the
prediction of 'dangerousness' is not established and clinicians should avoid 'conclusory'
judgments in this regard." Id. at 33.
7. Widespread disillusionment is replacing the optimism that initially accompanied the promise of the rehabilitation or corrections model of criminal sentencingthat individualized sentencing and treatment would promote shorter sentences and increased motivation for personal reform. California, which in 1917 became the first state
to adopt indeterminate sentencing and became a leader in the length of time it kept its
convicts confined, has now abandoned this approach. S.B. 42 (signed, Sept. 20, 1976).
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tent is no longer an acceptable justification for the wholesale denial of
due process for juveniles.8 In addition to this emphasis on constitutional rights, recent judicial decisions have developed a new doctrine,
the "right to treatment," regarded by many as a welcome development.9
In short, psychiatry and the law are gradually reflecting a greater
awareness of the individual freedoms at stake in parens patriae interventions.
Have these limitations on the therapeutic sanction arisen from a
re-evaluation of the actual basis of parens patriae? We think not, for
the fundamental premise is still accepted that there is a valid distinction
between criminal punishment and state ordered "treatment." The thesis presented here is that both psychiatry and the law have yet to confront the inherent and irreconcilable differences between bona fide
treatment and state sanctioned parens patriae intervention. Until this

fundamental confrontation takes place, civil rights reforms, although
necessary in and of themselves, only blunt our sensitivity while we proceed to replace old forms of benevolent control with new ones. For
reasons discussed below, this exchange may be far more ominous than
is generally recognized.
Our aim is to question the very roots of parens patriae, and the

analysis of language is a crucial element in achieving this end.

Any

effort by one individual to influence another is profoundly affected by

what both parties believe to be the purpose of the effort; furthermore,
this common understanding depends as much on the words chosen as

on the practices themselves. 10 Thus, despite recent judicial and legisFor a discussion of the destructive psychological impact of indeterminacy, see Coleman,
Prisons: The Crime of Treatment, 2 PSYCHrATmIC OPINION 5 (June 1974). For examples of specific abuses of treatment in prisons, see Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against
Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Opton].
8. A. PLATr, Tnm CHILD SAvEns: THE INvEmTON OF DELINQUENCY (1969)
[hereinafter cited as PLATr] is an excellent account of the historical developments underlying the benevolent facade of the juvenile court movement.
9. After initially taking a defensive posture, the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) has now come out in support of the doctrine. Psychiatric News, July 16, 1975,
at 1, col. 1. In our view, this stems from the APA's belated recognition that the right
to treatment doctrine lends support to involuntary psychiatric treatment. In addition,
the promulgation of standards of treatment, such as those enunciated in Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), encourages increased funding for mental hospitals.
10. For. a discussion of the impact of changing labels within a psychiatric context,
see T. SZAsz, Tim MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961) [hereinafter cited as SZAsz]. Cf.
P. FAR, WoRD PLAY: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN PEOPLE TxLK 83-95 (1973). Within the
context of what Farb calls "the passion for relegating certain words to taboo status and
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lative recognition of the civil rights questions inherent in parens patriae
interventions, these interventions continue to be considered as benevo-

lent treatment. In questioning this assumption and providing an alternative framework, we will first analyze, through language, the assumptions underlying state-sanctioned psychiatric "treatment." H-istoric
examples of control viewed as benevolence, considered together with
current developments of that view, provide a broad perspective within
which to view the future dangers of the therapeutic sanction.

Treatment Reconsidered
If treatment is to justify either civil intervention in the absence of
criminal conviction or vastly broadened discretionary power within the
criminal sanction, a clear understanding of the concept of treatment is
crucial. Surprisingly, the literature dealing with parens patriae has
been virtually silent on this fundamental issue."
Clearly linked with medicine, the concept of treatment is defined
as the "management in the application of remedies; medical or surgical

application or service.'

2

In the debate about whether psychiatric in-

terventions should properly be designated as treatments, the contro-

versy hinges on whether one considers emotional problems to be true
diseases or emotional responses to problems of living.' 3 The denomination of mental problems as diseases and psychiatric interventions as
treatments is unfortunate. But a far more compelling distinction between bona fide treatment and parens patriae treatment is the element
of volition.
Both medical ethics and the law clearly differentiate between
treatment and battery.' 4 The distinction disregards issues of effectivethen substituting euphemisms for them ...
" we wonder whether the word "punishment" may not have achieved a taboo status.
11. See, e.g., Krrnm, supra note 1. Despite his comprehensive review of parens
patriae literature in general, Kittrie fails to deal with what should or should not be considered treatment. Another recent overview, BROOKS, supra note 6, deals with the vagaries of such concepts as mental illness and psychiatric diagnoses, but it too fails to
discuss the nature of treatment.
12. 11 THE OxFoRD ENGLisH Dic-oNAnY 309 (1933).
13. SzAsz, supra note 10, questions whether psychiatric problems are a form of illness, whether psychiatric classifications are true diagnoses, and whether psychiatric help
is true treatment. Szasz's critique of the medical model has been widely misunderstood
as implying that mental problems are a myth; in fact he recognizes the reality of emotional problems but questions whether such problems are medical in nature and should
therefore be classified as illnesses. But see D. AusuBEL, Personality Disorder is Disease, 16 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 69 (1961).
14. In Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239, 502 P.2d 1, 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511

Spring 19761

PARENS PATRIAE 'TIREATMENT'

ness, side effects, skillfulness, and intent. The crucial point is whether
voluntary consent precedes the physician's actions. Without consent,
what would by all medical standards be considered treatment becomes
unlawful activity. Thus, the psychiatry practiced as parens patriae intervention upon patients who do not consent to it cannot qualify as bona
fide treatment. The careless acceptance of these interventions as treat-

ment has led not only to the waiving of due process guarantees, but
also to nonrecognition of the punitive quality of all parens patriae controls.1

5

Punishment Reconsidered
The nature of punishment is the second element of the traditional

treatment/punishment dichotomy at the logical core of parens patriae
philosophy. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, punishment
is:
the infliction of some pain, suffering, loss, or social disability as a
direct consequence of some action or omission on the part of the
person punished... . [T]he agent of punishment must be in a
position of legitimate authority over the punished. .... 16

This definition speaks neither of intent nor of the professional identity
of the agent of punishment.

Instead, the emphasis is on infliction of

something by one person upon another within the context of delegated
(1972), it was held that "[w]here a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform
one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for
which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery." See also Berkey v.
Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969).
15. See Opton, supra note 7, for examples of therapy-punishment in prison. He
discusses electro-convulsive shock, drugs, brainwashing, and segregation as examples of
punishment as therapy. He argues that these practices may be viewed as both therapy
and punishment, and should therefore be regulated as punishments. He reaches this
conclusion despite his statement that "[w]hen a medical procedure is done at the request
of a patient and for his benefit, it is a treatment. When the identical medical procedure
is done against a person's interests or will, it is either a battery, if lacking legal sanction, or a punishment, if imposed by legal authority." Id. at 608. This statement seems
inconsistent with Opton's conclusion that a procedure could be simultaneously treatment
and punishment, but appears to support our hypothesis that all treatment without consent
is punishment.
16. 15 ENcYcLOPAEDIA BRrrANNiCA: MACROPAEDIA 281 (15th ed. 1974). The concept of punishment has received much more attention than the concept of treatment, perhaps because punishment is generally recognized as an ethical question whereas treatment, which is usually left to physicians and scientists, has been considered beyond the
review of lay commentaries. We have found that the Britannica's definition of punishment is generally mirrored by other commentators. See CONTEMPOXAtRY PUNIsHMENT:
VIEws, EXPLANAMrIONS, AND JUSTIFICAIONS (R. Gerber & P. McAnany eds. 1972), particularly Flew, Definition of Punishment, at 31-35. See also Bittner & Platt, The Meaning of Punishment, 2 IssuEs IN CRMaNoLOGY 79 (1966).
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state authority. We posit that the above definition of punishment provides a conceptual framework for the realistic analysis of state sanctioned intervention.
While prosecutors, judges, and prison guards are assumed to be
in the business of punishment, however fairly or unfairly administered,
it is assumed that therapists, as humanitarian professionals, offer
treatment. A marvelous circularity results. If your intent (however
measured or defined) is benevolent, you are a therapist; if you are a
therapist, your intent is prima facie benevolent, and whatever you do is
therapy.
These false criteria-benevolent intent and professional identity
-upon which the parens patriae distinction between punishment and
treatment has been drawn, have become the cornerstones of the therapeutic sanction. In the early years of this century, George Ives formulated a philosophy of treatment which remains basically unchanged.
His initial comment was that punishment is an irrational remedy; 17 his
expressed hope was that,
in the Future, when the Courts convict a prisoner, he will not merely disappear from view, to undergo a senseless, indiscriminating
punishment. He will not, in fact, be punished more than any other
patient; but he may have to undergo a course of treatment varied
according to his special need, which may, or may not, be painful
in its operation. The difference between the cut of the surgeon
and the stab of the assassin lies mainly in the motive which made
the wound. They will inflict no moment of unnecessary suffering;
if they have to give any pain, there will be purpose in it, and a
friendly purpose.' 8
Despite Ives and the century-old rationale of parens patriae, the
crucial difference between the surgeon and the assassin lies neither in
the motive nor in the degree of skill of each, but rather in the consent
given the surgeon and denied the assassin. The surgeon, absent such
consent, may be considered an assassin of sorts:
Anglo-Saxon law does not recognize. . . nonconsensual treatment.
... [A]n operation without the patient's consent.., is not treatment but battery .... [U]nconsented surgery is, in the eyes of the
law, tantamount to attack with a knife.' 9
Parens Patriae Treatment as Punishment
We have seen that the concept of parens patriae treatment is a
17. G. IvEs, A ISTORY OiF PENAL METODs 266 (1914).
18. Id. at 335.
19. G. Alexander & T. Szasz, From Contract to Status via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA

CIAR& LAw. 537, 548 (1973).

Spring 19761
Spring 19761

PARENS PATRIAY- 'TRLEATMENT"
PARENS PATRIAB "TREATMENT"

semantic fiction since this treatment lacks the consent that is the sine
qua non of bona fide treatment. Is state ordered "help" thus inherently punishment? In light of the elements of punishment, as discussed
above, no valid distinction exists between parens patriae treatment and
legal punishment. Pain, suffering, loss, and disability can be inflicted

by the legal agent of punishment and can also result from bona fide
treatment.

But in bona fide treatment they are a side-effect of pro-

cedures undertaken to lure or alleviate an illness, whereas in parens
patriae treatment they are inflicted because of some act or omission.2 0

Although in parens patriae treatment the agent has legitimate authority
to intervene, the intervention is nonetheless coercive, whereas the agent
of bona fide treatment intervenes only with the consent of the patient.2 1

Parens patriae treatment involves not only the physical pain and
suffering that may result from particular forced interventions, but also

the psychological pain and suffering that may result from disculturation,
isolation, dehumanization, and loss of freedom, all direct consequences

of the intervention itself.22 Regardless of the manner in which it occurs or the intent with which it is done, forcing something on someone
represents a loss of freedom of choice and frequently results in pain
and suffering. When we add that this pain, suffering, loss, or disability
is sanctioned by law and is justified by action or omission on the part

of the subject, it becomes evident that all parens patriae treatment constitutes legal punishment.23
20. Although civil commitment of mental patients is often rationalized as a response to mental illness, it is the individual's behavior which leads to interference in
his life. Even were we to ignore the inability of psychiatrists to demonstrate either the
reliability or validity of their diagnoses (supra note 6), the fact is that most individuals
with a particular diagnosis, such as paranoid schizophrenic, are not committed. The difference between those who are committed and those who are not lies in their behaviorwhether it appears that they are attempting to harm themselves or others, or are generally acting in a way that is intolerable to others.
21. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
22. A number of recent psychological works have questioned whether the negative
side effects of institutionalization itself are counterproductive of effective treatment.
Most notably, the writings of Goffman and Scheff have emphasized that mental institutions make little serious effort to equip their patients with the ability to become free
and independent people. Instead of learning how to cope effectively with the problems
that initially catapulted them into the hospital, institutionalized individuals are forced
to undergo a variety of counter-therapeutic measures that ultimately render most of
them incapable of ever achieving the institution's supposed goal-a return to society.
See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961); T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL (1966).
23. Our insistence that all parens patriae treatment is, in truth, legal punishment,
and is therefore indefensible in the absence of criminal offense, nonetheless leaves room
for the possibility of certain other parens patriae interventions. These are genuinely
based on status rather than on behavior and therefore should not be considered legal
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The use of the word "punishment" to describe a therapist's best
efforts, or of the word "prison" to describe a humanely appointed hospital facility, will strike many as unduly harsh. Words have had the
power to comfort us, and have played and continue to play a major role
in the deception inherent in parens patriae interventions. The California Welfare and Institutions Code provides a typical example:
It is hereby declared that the provisions of this code reflect the concern of the Legislature that mentally disordered persons are to be
regarded as patients to be provided care and treatment and not as
inmates of institutions for the purposes of secluding them from the
rest of the public.
Whenever any provision of this code theretofore or hereafter24
uses the term "inmate," it shall be construed to mean "patient."
Such linguistic manipulation is not new. A nineteenth century example of the power of words is the dialogue between Elizabeth Ware
Packard, a critic of mental asylums, and her psychiatrist, following
Packard's incarceration:
[Doctor:] "I don't like your calling this place a prison so much; for
it isn't so.... You may call it a place of confinement if you
choose, but not a prison."
[Packard:] "It is a prison to me .... I intend to clothe truth in its
own drapery and to call things by their true names as I apprehend them."
[Doctor:] "But you will acknowledge, Mrs. Packard, that the penitentiary inmates are on a different plane as prisoners, from
what you are?"
[Packard:] "The penitentiary is our government's place of punishing the guilty; insane asylums are our government's place of
punishing the innocent. . ....
[Doctor:] "You would not, in writing a dictionary, describe each as
alike, would you?"
[Packard:] "I should'25say they are one and the same thing, as to
being prisoners.
punishment. Guardianships for certain retarded children or brain damaged individuals,
and compulsory education are examples of legally sanctioned interference that may impose pain, suffering, loss, and disability. The intervention results not from any action
or omission of the individual, however, but rather from their state of being. Whether
or not each of these parens patriae interventions is wise social policy is beyond the scope
of this commentary.
24. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 4132 (West 1972).
25. 2 E. PACKARD, MODERN PERSECrTION 132-35 (1873) (emphasis deleted). In
1863 Elizabeth Packard's husband, a clergyman, kidnapped and imprisoned her in an Illinois asylum because she dared to teach in her Bible class that human beings are born
good and not evil. Elizabeth Packard, a free-thinker in far more than religious matters,
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We desperately need the kind of linguistic honesty that Packard advocated. Just as the misuse of words has, in the past, been a powerful

element in the successful effort to disguise punishment as treatment,
such misuse continues to hamper psychiatric and legal decisionmaking.

Prisons are now "medical facilities," prison guards are "correctional officers," and prisoners are "inmates" or "patients";2 6 the list of

such linguistic sleights-of-hand is long. This commentary will focus on
one example of the continuing power of language to sanitize policies
that pose grave threats to free society, the emerging doctrine of the
right to treatment.
A Strange New Right

The right to treatment has its legal roots in the relatively recent
judicial finding that involuntary hospitalization without treatment does

in fact constitute punishment.2 7 The corollary is that involuntary hoschallenged the system by bringing charges against both her husband and the superintendent of the asylum to which she had been confined. Her case was later to be hailed by
R.B. Caplan in her book, PSYCHIATRY AND THE COMMUNITY IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA

(1969), as "[one of the most notorious and significant of the American false commitment cases." Caplan goes on to state that "[n]ot only did Mrs. Packard win her case, a
fact which horrified the superintendents, who always insisted that she had been, and still
was, insane, but she launched a national crusade to prevent false commitment of others."
Id. at 191. As a result of this crusade, Illinois in 1867 passed the "Personal Liberty
Law," popularly known as the "Packard Law," and a number of other states enacted similar legislation requiring a jury trial on the issue of lunacy before any patient could be admitted to an asylum. For a more in-depth account of Packard's efforts in this area, see
her two-volume work, MODERN PERsEctrroN, supra. The first volume deals with
mental institutions and the second concerns married women's rights. In addition, Phyllis Chesler's WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972) can provide some useful insights into how
and why women have historically suffered at the hands of psychiatry and its advocates.
KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT 104 (1973). A 1960 ABA
26. See J. MrrroRa,
Journal article included an entire section on terminology, which remains as instructive
today as it was in 1960. "The reader may have been disturbed by the use of the terms
'inmate' instead of 'patient,' 'institutionalization' or 'imprisonment' instead of 'hospitalization,' and 'mental institution' or 'mental prison' instead of 'mental hospital.' There
is an undoubted therapeutic value in mentally ill persons being told that they are patients
who are being hospitalized in a mental hospital for care and treatment. Their families
want to feel that their relatives are in a mental hospital. The community feels satisfied
that its mentally ill are hospitalized. The morale and efficiency of the medical staff
and other personnel are kept up by the feeling that they are working in a hospital.
'There is a limit, however, to the benefits of this terminology . . . . For as long
as one thinks about patients, doctors, mental hospitals and hospitalization, one can easily
be deluded into misinterpreting reality." Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46
A.B.AJ. 499, 504 (1960) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum]. See also
Goffman, Characteristicsof Total Institutions, SYMPOSIUM ON PEVENTIVE AND SoCrUL
PsYcHuRY 43 (1957).
27. The landmark decision in this area was Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). In his majority opinion, Judge Bazelon identified treatment as a necessary
condition of incarceration for the mentally disordered. He noted that "[a]bsent treat-
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pitalization with treatment is not punishment. Such logic is fast becoming conventional wisdom among progressives, both psychiatric and

legal.2 8 Any skepticism that has arisen focuses on the issue of effectiveness:

whether psychiatric diagnosis and treatment is sufficiently

quantifiable, and if so, whether there is evidence that the psychiatric
interventions are actually effective enough to justify involuntary hospitalization.2"

Repeated efforts to document effectiveness have shown the

difficulty, if not the impossibility, of demonstrating the outcome of psychiatric therapy. 30 This in no way proves that psychiatric interventions
are ineffective, as some critics suggest, but simply that the use of effective treatment as a legal quid pro quo for deprivation of liberty is based
ment, the hospital is 'transform[ed] . . .into a penitentiary where one could be held
indefinitely for no convicted offense ...... Id. at 453, quoting Ragsdale v. Overholser,
281 F.2d 943, 950 (1960) (Fahy, J., concurring).
Because the opinion in Rouse is based on statutes enacted by Congress, D.C. Code
§§ 21-501, 21-543, 21-561 to -564, 24-301 (Supp. V, 1966), its value as a precedent may
be limited; at least one circuit judge suggested that later statutory interpretation by the
same court of appeals has implicitly revised the holding of Rouse. See Dobson v.
Cameron, 383 F.2d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.,concurring). Nevertheless
the impact of Judge Bazelon's decision in Rouse was that parens patriae considerations,
which had permitted the confinement of individuals who had not been convicted of any
crime, now required treatment for such individuals.
At least one circuit has gone even further by holding that "persons committed under
what we have termed a parens patriae ground for commitment must be given treatment
lest the involuntary commitment amount to an arbitrary exercise of government power
proscribed by the due process clause." Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th
Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The court claimed this right of treatment
exists regardless of whether those to be treated were committed under a parens patriae
or police power rationale. Id. Donaldson is a significant decision because it finds constitutional rather than statutory underpinnings for a right of treatment. Cf. Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
28. It is ironic that one of the first pronouncements of this new philosophy was
made in an ABA Journal article that appeared long before the initial Rouse decision.
See Birnbaum, supra note 26. Birnbaum, pleading with the legal system to create a new
constitutional right, the right to treatment, said in part that "an institution that involuntarily institutionalizes the mentally ill without giving them adequate medical treatment
for their mental illness is a mental prison and not a mental hospital. . . ." Id. at 503.
See also Stone, Overview: The Right to Treatment--Comments on the Law & Its Impact, 132 AM. J.PSYCIuATRY 1125 (1975); Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 742 (1969); A Symposium-the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO.
L.J. 673 (1969); Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment,
77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134
(1967).
29. See, e.g., Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36
U. CHL L. REv. 755, 765-69 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
30. Hans Eysenck, an outspoken critic of the ineffectiveness of psychotherapeutic
treatment provides an extensive review of the evaluation research undertaken thus far
in the area. See H. EYsENcK, THE Fcrrs Orz PSYCHOTHERAPY (1966). See also Bergin, Some Implications of Psychotherapy Research for Therapeutic Practice, 71 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 235 (1966).
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more on pious hope than on proven results. Judge Johnson's recent
mandate that there must be a "treatment available for the illness," 3'
is typical of the legal and judicial faith that, with adequate safeguards,
psychiatric treatments may be sufficiently effective to form the basis for
civil commitment. The bench continues to hold tenaciously to the century-old belief that psychiatry, as a legitimate branch of medicine, has
specific and demonstrably effective treatments for reliably diagnosable
diseases.
But what if we could prove, either now or in the future, that psychiatry is capable of specific diagnoses and effective treatments?
Would the right to treatment then be a legally and ethically supportable
doctrine? The preoccupation with effectiveness, on the part of the
bench, the bar, and the psychiatrists, suggests that we have failed once
again, to ask the fundamental questions: What is a right, and what is
treatment?
As our previous discussion of the concept of treatment indicated,
bona fide treatment requires a consenting patient; anything forced on
an individual through the authority of the state as a result of unacceptable behavior is properly regarded as punishment.82 Under this analysis the right to treatment immediately presents basic contradictions.
The treatment is said to be the quid pro quo for the deprivation of freedom, but since the treatment is coercive it is not really treatment at all,
but punishment. Thus if words were used more honestly, the "right
to treatment' would be the "right to punishment," the individual's right
to be punished by the state for being mentally disturbed. However,
we know of no mental patients or their advocates who have demanded
that the state honor their right to be punished. Consequently the treatment to which incarcerated persons are said to have a right is at best
a legal fiction."3
The other half of the right to treatment is the concept of a right.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a right is "[a] legal, equitable, or moral title or claim to the possession of property or authority,
the enjoyment of privileges or immunities. . . .""

The key concept

31. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
32. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
33. Katz questions whether the right to treatment may be a legal and linguistic fiction: "Mhe right to treatment introduces the danger of an inevitable duty to be treated
akin to thought reform or indefinite detention perniciously cloaked by therapeutic 'kindness.'" Katz, supra note 29, at 763. He also notes that "[i]n all calls for reform . . .
there is the danger that after implementation of reform, the same abuses will emerge
again in new, though initially disguised, forms." Id. at 782.
34. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 670 (1933).
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is the freedom to enjoy certain things, such as speech, and the freedom
to be spared certain things, such as unreasonable search and seizure.
It makes no sense whatever to label as a right anything forced on an
individual, and we see no reason to allow coercive psychiatric treatment
to be an exception.
If both the terms "right" and "treatment" in the phrase "right to
treatment" involve the deceptive use of language, there may be something gained by seeking out the real meaning of this legal doctrine. If,
as we have attempted to show, forced treatment is correctly termed
punishment, a more honest term for right to treatment is justification
for treatment. This label discloses the state's effort to rationalize, and
to cast in the light of benevolence, its continuing punishment and control of deviants who might be difficult to process within the criminal
justice system. The depiction of forced treatment as a right obfuscates
the reality that the right to treatment is a justification for punishment.
Punishment is, of course, not new, but the doctrine of a right to
treatment provides a justification for continued non-criminal punishment in the face of a growing recognition of both ethical and constitutional problems within the therapeutic sanction. It is quite common for
apologists of involuntary psychiatric interventions, particularly the psychiatrists, to claim that if we were to stop incarcerating mental patients
we would be abandoning them and depriving them of their right to
treatment. 8'
Some of the most knowledgeable critics have considered the right
to treatment as a useful vehicle in the struggle against involuntary psychiatry. 6 This view, we feel, will prove extremely short-sighted. The
right to treatment may well become a rationale for new forms of parens
patriae control. It is to these new developments that we now turn.
From the Cage to the Net
The importance of state mental hospitals, first built in this country
in the nineteenth century, appears to be vaning. State mental hospitals were conceived and built in the midst of great hope, but repeated
efforts at reform have wrought no real change in state warehousing."7
Despite the latest therapeutic efforts to breathe life into state hospi35. See, e.g., Peszke, Is Dangerousness an Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitment?, 132 AM. J. PSYCHTATRY 825 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Psychiatric News, Dec. 3, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
37. See RoTHmN, supranote 4.
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tals,38 these isolated institutions do not have a bright future. While we
applaud this decline, we must evaluate current and future alternatives.
We are alarmed at what is emerging, and believe that the dangers of

parens patriae are growing rather than diminishing.
With the growing recognition that institutions have been neither

effective in providing much more than custodial care, nor sufficient in
maintaining control over very many people, it was inevitable that methods would evolve to accomplish in communities what has been unwork-

able in institutions. Emerging at the same time as this transition from
warehousing Of a few to "treatment" of many, the right to treatment

provides a philosophical rationale for extension of state interventions
beyond institutions and into communities. Although recent case law
deals with institutionalized persons,39 we see a distinct possibility that
this doctrine will be broadened in future years to justify new forms of

forced community intervention as well. While state hospital populations have declined steadily, data from community programs indicate
that more citizens than ever before are under psychiatric care; 40 but
only recently has it become possible to reach more than those few who
could be housed in institutions.

Given the predominating influence of psychiatry's medical approach to deviance,41 it is not surprising that the principles of preventive medicine have guided community outreach programs. 42 The nine-

teenth century witnessed brilliant medical triumphs, particularly for the
38. In recent years, prisons, mental hospitals, juvenile institutions, schools, and
nursing homes have seen the development of treatment programs oriented for the most
part toward behavior modification. See Goodall, Shapers at Work, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Nov. 1972, at 53. Growing out of the predominance of behavioral psychology in academic circles these programs are spreading rapidly through many institutions-particularly those that deal with captive or semi-captive populations. In our view, a major
factor in their selective appearance in closed settings is that these programs require a
high degree of control over their subjects. A typical example is the widespread use of
token economics in mental hospitals and juvenile institutions. Under such a system
basic amenities must be purchased with tokens, which are given as rewards for behavior
desired by the institution. Although token economics looks like a thinly disguised
method of control, it has nonetheless been viewed by some as a great breakthrough in
institutional treatment. See Davids, Therapeutic Approaches to Children in Residential
Treatment, 30 AM. PsYcHoLorIsT 809-14 (Aug. 1975).
39. See notes 27 and 31 supra.
40. Greenblatt & Glazier, The Phasing Out of Mental Hospitals in the United
States, 132 AM. J. PsYcmTRY 1135 (1975).
41. See note 2 supra.
42. For a thorough overview of the theory and practice of preventive psychiatry
from a community-based perspective, see G. CAPLAN, PRiNciPLEs oF PREvENTrvn PsycmiATY (1964).
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control of contagious diseases. The emerging behavioral sciences
adopted the same preventive medical approach, 43 and policy makers of
the day were convinced that the approach would succeed."' The efforts that ensued-institutionalization of the mentally disordered, rehabilitation of the criminal, and reform of wayward youth-have obviously floundered, but the reasons for the failure remain unresolved.
Did it result from the misplaced emphasis on deviance as a reflection
of illness, best approached through healing, with corresponding neglect
of the political and economic roots of the problem?4" Or did it result,
as prevailing opinion contends, from inadequate effort in the application of basically sound principles of preventive psychiatry?""
General acceptance of the latter view has enabled us to rush headlong into a new attempt to use the principles of preventive medicine
and the apparatus of the state to bring "help" to vastly increasing numbers of disturbed and disturbing citizens. Today's methods, unlike
those of the past hundred years, appear to take a truly preventive approach, largely because today's technology has given the state the capacity to reach every citizen. While space will not allow a thorough
review of these developments, a brief glimpse at some typical examples
will help bring into perspective our present position and our future direction.
Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) is a
federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare program through
which the government intends to screen all children of welfare mothers. 47 The program includes pediatric, dental, and developmental
screening, beginning at birth, with periodic re-examinations throughout
childhood. The developmental screening is increasingly the target of
43. For a useful account of this nineteenth century optimism, see W. TATrNER,
Trattner offers the following example
from the charity movement of the 1870's: "The organized charity movement... hoped

FRoM PooR LAW TO WELFARE STATE (1974).
to treat poverty by

.. .

having 'friendly visitors' look into each case so as to diagnose

the cause of destitution. Investigation was the keystone of treatment; granting relief
without investigation was analogous to prescribing medicine without diagnosis." Id. at
84 (emphasis added).
44. See, e.g., RoTHmAN, supra note 4; PLA'rT, supra note 8.
45. For useful discussions of social deviance and its various conceptualizations, see
H. BECKER, OtnrswEas (1963) and E. SCHUR, RADIcAL NoN-INTEnV-noN (1973).
46. E.g., K. MENNINGER, THE CRiME OF PumNsmENT (1968).
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTh, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ManIcAm PROGRAM
REGULATION GumiE EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT FOR INDIvWUALS UNDER 21 (Social and Rehabilitation Service Pub. No. MSA-PRG-21, June 28,

1972) [hereinafter cited as PROGRAM

REGULATION

GUIDE].
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359 ,

attack.48 Proponents of the program have recently denied that they intend to do psychiatric or behavioral screening, and have even admitted

the dangers of such a plan. They insist they intend only developmental
assessment, and that they have no intention of letting racial or economic
factors skew their results. They insist, moreover, that the information will be kept confidential in computerized federal files that monitor each child's physical and mental health.4 9 California has enacted
its own version of EPSDT, known as Child Health Disability Prevention
(CHDP),50 which will not discriminate in favor of the poor but will
screen all children, from birth to age twenty-one. At present, each
California child must be screened before entering the first grade, but
no one seems quite clear about what treatment will await those children
said to show deviant development. 5
Another example of the attempt to treat a social problem with preventive medicine is the current effort to develop screening for violence
potential. Based on what amounts to a new phrenology, citizens would
be screened for high violence potential indicators, such as chromosomal, hormonal, EEG, or psychological abnormalities. 52 A nationwide
network of such violence screening centers has been advocated:
[We must set certain basic standards of behavior (e.g., "golden
rule" or "Ten Commandments") that any individual with a normal
brain can follow. In addition, we need to find some way to detect
those individuals with brain abnormalities
who are unlikely to be
53
able to follow those standards.
Another recent development is the introduction of mandatory outpatient treatment. Just as one result of the community mental health
48. See Bauer, U.S. Screens Children of the Poor for "Deviance," San Francisco
Examiner & Chronicle, Nov. 9, 1975, § A, at 21, col. 1; McCabe, Feds Spy on Poor
Kids, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 1, 1975, at 35, col. 2; McCabe, Feds Spy on Poor
Kids (2), San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 2, 1975, at 39, col. 2.
49. Although the PROGRAM REGULAlON GumDE, supra note 47, at 6, states that the
purposes of such a record system are to prevent "costly and unnecessary repetition of
screening and diagnostic procedures" and to facilitate a "detailed analysis of the costs
and benefits of the screening program," the potential dangers of such a record system
are apparent.
50. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 306-09 (West Supp. 1976).
51. Minority communities in particular are seriously concerned about the effect
such screening programs may have on them. See The Black Panther, June 9, 1975, at
9, col. 1.
52. In an earlier article, a parallel was drawn between the original phrenologists
who searched for "born criminals" by. measuring supposed deformities of ear lobes,
noses, and skulls, and the new phrenologists who perpetuate such beliefs by searching
for deformities in physiological, genetic, and biochemical examinations. Coleman, Perspectives on the Medical Research of Violence, 44 Am. J. ORTHopsycH. 675 (1974).
53. V. MARK& F. ERiN, VIOLENCE AND THEBRANI 160 (1970).
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movement has been the use of forced hospitalization on more people
than could be housed in state hospitals, the advent of forced out-patient

programs will spread the net even wider. The California legislature,
for example, in 1974 passed such legislation, but it was vetoed by the

governor.

4

In 1975, California enacted legislation allowing conserva-

tors to require conservatees to undergo out-patient treatment. 55
There is every likelihood that this pressure to broaden the forms

of involuntary psychiatry will continue, and prophetic vision is hardly
required to imagine that the favored form of treatment will be maintenance pharmacotherapy. This major tool of community psychiatry is
said to offer for the first time a truly preventive approach to mental
illness. 56 Much as an antitubercular drug may be required for a lifetime in order to keep a case of tuberculosis dormant, only lifetime drug

treatment will keep major depressive and schizophrenic disorders in remission.

Increasing numbers of patients are being diagnosed as "bipo-

lar depressives," for which the highly toxic lithium carbonate is the
usual treatment. 57 Clinics are opening whose sole function is to deliver
maintenance doses of lithium on a lifetime prophylactic basis. 58 Maintenance or prophylactic drug treatment is also increasingly used for
those diagnosed as "schizophrenic." 5' 9 The primary drugs prescribed
are the neuroleptic agents, which may cause severe side effects."0
54. A.B. 4200 (introduced, May 2, 1974).
55. Ch. 960, § 6, 6 DEERiNG'S CAL. CODES, ADVANCE LEGIsrLArIv SERVic, at
287-88 (1975).
56. See Davis, Overview: Maintenance Therapy in Psychiatry: I: Schizophrenia,
132 AM. J.PSYCmATRY 1237 (1975); 11: Affective Disorder, 133 AM. J.PSYCMATRY 1
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
57. Manic-depressive illness is a psychiatric diagnosis enjoying a renaissance. Implying the presence of periods of excitable, impulsive, and excessively elated behavior
alternating with major depressions, the diagnosis was infrequently used until the past
decade. The bipolar form is said to be a different illness from the unipolar type, which
shows no manic phases between periods of depression.
Initially the manic phase was the target of treatment with lithium carbonate, a
heavy metal salt having potential toxic effects on the major organs of the body.
Recently, however, unipolar depressives were found to respond equally well to lithium
prophylaxis. See Davis, supra note 56, pt. II. Only in recent years has lithium carbonate been taken out of the experimental category and made generally available to
physicians. Its availability corresponded with the beginning of an increase in the use
of the diagnostic category of manic-depressive illness. Apparently the presence of the
newly available pharmaceutical product has been a major influence upon psychiatric diagnosis.
58. Fieve, The Lithium Clinic: A New Model for the Delivery of Psychiatric
Services, 132 AM. J. PSYCHATRY 1018 (1975).
59. See Davis, supra note 56, pt. I.
60. See Crane, Persistent Dyskinesla, 122 BRTSH J. PSYCHIATRY 395 (April

Spring 19761

PARENS PATRIAE "TREATMENT"

The development of depot forms of psychoactive drugs, in which
the drug is suspended in a medium that the body absorbs slowly, has
been considered a great breakthrough. 61 Given by injection, the drugs
continue to exert their effect for two to three weeks. There can be
little doubt that the pharmaceutical industry will recognize the potential
of even longer-acting preparations. These depot drugs are preferred
for the chronic, resistive patient who refuses to take regular medications. Psychiatrists are being urged to be therapeutically persistent and
innovative in insuring that their patients, particularly those in the community, receive their medication.6 2 In some communities, those patients who fail to appear on schedule for their injection are forcibly
brought to a community clinic for their treatment. Frank Ayd, a leading proponent of depot drugs, gives some idea of the extent to which
such treatment could be utilized:
Eleven years ago, not one patient was being treated with a depot
neuroleptic. Today, an estimated 400,000 patients have been and
are being treated worldwide .... Cognizant of these facts, some
pharmaceutical companies are making additional depot neuroleptics.
...[Miore and more psychiatric patients will be treated with
long-acting oral and injectable preparations . . . Of necessity,
mental health care professionals will resort to pharmacotherapeutic
regimens that enable them to care for the largest number of patients in the most convenient, expeditious, and economical way
feasible. There is every reason to predict that pharmacotherapy
with long-acting oral and injectable drugs will escalate and that the
use of short-acting oral compounds will decline proportionately. It
is conceivable that by the year 2000, the later preparations will
be prescribed sparingly. 63
The current direction, then, is toward a massive program of
screening for deviance, together with mandatory out-patient treatment,
in the form of maintenance drug treatment for those found in need of
"help." Because the drugs would be given to prevent something that
has not appeared or is in remission, there would be no way to ensure
either that the initial screening prediction was accurate, or that the in1973); Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in its Twentieth Year, 181 ScMIcE
124
(July 13, 1973).
61. See Ayd, The Depot Fluphenazines: A ReappraisalAfter 10 Years' Clinical
Experience, 132 AM. J.PsycmAmy 491 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ayd].
62. See Ayd, supra note 61, at 491. Ayd considers those who resist taking these
medications to be "drug defectors" and states that injectable long acting tranquilizers are
"a most important step forward" because they "remove responsibility for taking medicine
from patients unable to assume it." Id.
63. See Ayd, supra note 61, at 499.
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dividual would not have another episode of a previous problem. But
as with all preventive treatment, one does not wait until the disease appears; to do so would be to deprive the individual of his right to treatment.
To many, this analysis will seem alarmist in the extreme. Nevertheless, the danger is quite real that such a system of control could be
instituted. The history of benevolent state intervention is filled with
examples of sweet dreams becoming nightmares. We see no reason
to believe this tendency has been reversed. Instead we find evidence
of the continuing attempt by the state to maintain the status quo
through the control of deviants. The seductions of our technology will
only make sweeping programs of state benevolence more difficult to
resist.
It is our belief that resistance begins with understanding, and that
language has been a primary vehicle to prevent an understanding by
the people that real treatment is incompatible with the power of the
state. Until the state restricts itself to offering services, we must all
recognize and assume responsibility for the fact that we live in a society
that not only punishes the guiltless, but has not yet had the courage to
admit it.

